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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE MAKING THE STATUS OF BEING A
DRUG ADDICT A CRIviE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL-
ROBINSON v. CALIFoRNIA (Sup. Ct. 1962)
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to jail under a Cali-
fornia statute penalizing anyone found to be "addicted" to the use
of narcotics.' -Though there was evidence that petitioner had re-
cently used narcotics in California, the instructions of the trial
court authorized a conviction merely upon proof that the defendant
was "addicted" to the use of narcotics, and had not reformed at the
time of his arrest. The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and reversed the conviction.2 Held: The imprisonment of a
person found to-be in a "status" or "condition ' '3 of drug addiction
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4
'CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1962 Supp.) provides:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to
the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the
direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and ad-
minister narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense to show
that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violat-
ing any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more
than one year in the county jail. The court may place a person
-convicted hereunder on probation for a period not to exceed five
years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require
as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the countyjail for at least 90 days. In no event does the court have the power
to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation
of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
2 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), rehearing denied, 83 S.Ct. 202
(1963).
3 The Court said, 370 U.S. at 666:
This statute... is not one which punishes a person for the use of
narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial
or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration. It is
not a law which even purports to provide or require medical treat-
ment. Rather, we deal with a statute which makes the 'status'
of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender
may be prosecuted 'at any time before he reforms.' California has
said that a person can be continuously guilty of this offense,
whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within
the State, and whether or not he has been guilty of any antisocial
behavior there.
4 The Court said, Id. at 667:
We cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same cate-
gory [as a statute punishing mental illness or leprosy] .... [A]
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The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
cruel and unusual punishments by the federal government. 5 It was
not until Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber that the Court
assumed, but did not decide, that the-fourteenth amendment would
forbid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments by the
states. Robinson is the first case in which the Court has actually
held that the fourteenth amendment would apply these restrictions.
Even Robinson, however, does not-decide Whether other provisions
of the eighth amendment -would be included within fourteenth
amendment due process guarantees-
Mr. Justice Harlan,- in his concurring opinion in Robinson,8
suggests that the case could have been decided on the ground that
the statute makes the mere desire or.propensity to commit a crime
a criminal act, -and. therefore is an arbitrary -exercise of the state
police power. The case was, however, decided on "cruel and unusual
punishment" grounds. Why did the Court invoke this rarely
used clause 9 to decide the case? Into what areas of the criminal
law will the implications of Robinson reach? It is the purpose here to
consider these and-other questions raised by the Robinson opinion.
state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as -a criminal,
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
State or-been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a
-cruel -ajicI unusual punishment in- Violation of the Fourteenth
-Amendrfent: -
5 U.S. CONST., amend. VII, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
exdesive fm es imposed, nor'cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
GLouisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweher,-329 U.S. 459 (1947), made this
assumption, but did not so decide.
7See note 5, supra. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.- Resweber, note 6, supra,
cited in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 666, seems to assume. that all
of the eighth amendment would be included within fourteenth amend-
ment provisions.
8 Robinson- v, California, 370 U.S.- 660,. 678-79 (1962).
9In Tiop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958), the Court said:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and un-
Usualrhas not been detailedby this Court. [citations omitted] But
the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established in
the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice .... The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.... This Court has had little occasion to give pre-
cise content to the Eighth Amendment,- and, in an enlightened
democracy such as ours, this is not surprising.
See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
CASENOTES
I.
THE CRIMINAL POWER OF THE STATE--
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The CourU ad usuiffly dealt with the "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" clause in cases involving the propriety of the form of pun-
ish-ient.10 Ii Robinson, 'h6wever, the sentence 'involved- only a
short imprisonment," which the Court agreed was not in itself
druel1 2 and- which was certainly hot, in the traditional sense, un-
- ual's As.a'puhishment for being in the "status" of narcotic ad-
1OTr6p-v. Dutlles, 356 -U.S. 86 (1958) held a statute punishing wartime
'disertibn by loss of citizenship' tcr be cruel .and unusual. In -Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, note 6 supra, the Court said that an attempt
to execute by electricity where a previous attempt had failed was not
cruel and unusual. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) held
that cadena temporal, a punishment involving certain civil disabilities,
was cruel and unusual. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) and Wilker-
son v. Utah, 99- U.S. 130 (1878), respectively upheld electrocution and
shooting as-proper means for exacting the death penalty. Such objec-
tions to the form of punishments have been considered in cases citing
Robinson. See, e.g., Kaganovitch v. Kilkins, 305 F.2d .715 (2d Cir. 1962);
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
11 The case does not specify the sentence given below, but it was apparently
for the minimum statutory period of ninety days.
12 The7 Court said:
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the 'question
'cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would
-be "a 'drue and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
cold. 370 U.S. at 667.
13It has been said that only those punishments which were considered
cruel and unusual at common law: In re Pinaire, 46 F. Supp. 113 (N.D.
Tex. . 1942); People v. Sarnoff, 302 Mich. 206, 4 N.W.2d 544 (1942); or
which had become obsolete at the time of the writing of the Constitu-
tion: Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D.C. Nev. 1918); or are inherently
inhumane and barbarous: In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Black v.
United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959); People v. Sarnoff, 302 Mich.
266, 4 N.W.2d 544 (1942); or which are shocking to the sense of justice
of reasonable people: Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957);
State v. Becker, 3 S.D. 29, 51 N.W. 1018 (1892); will constitute" cruel
and unusual punishment. In In re Pinaire, supra, 46 F. Supp. at 113,
the court said: " 'Cruel and unusual punishments,' under-the prohibition
bf 'Ke -8th Amendment, usually implies something inhumane and bar-
bardts, or, some punishment unknown at common law." See also 4
BrcKSTONE, COwmENTARmS 377, "[T]he humanity of the English na-
tion has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost general' mitigation
of such parts of these judgments as savor of torture or. cruelty; - . ."
In Kasper Y. Brittain, supra at 96, the court said: "Punishment is not
'cruel and unusual', unless it is so greatly disproportionate to the offense
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diction, however, this sentence, or indeed, any sentence, would be
cruel and unusual.14 Being an addict is not the type of wrong
which is open to the criminal sanctions of the state. The attack of
the Court, then, is upon the power of the state to punish, not merely
upon the form of punishment which the state has chosen.
The Court has often said that mere substantive due process
is no longer available to permit the judiciary to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the legislatures of the states.15 For this reason,
in considering state court convictions under a due process chal-
lenge, the Court has examined them in the light of whether the
substantive prohibitions of state statutes infringed upon specific
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, 16 religion, 7
press,18 or the right to travel.19 Robinson, however, does not stand
for the proposition that a person has a right to be addicted to
committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of
justice."
14 Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at
677, says: "A prosecution for addiction, with its resulting stigma and
irreparable damage to the good name of the accused, cannot be justified
as a means of protecting society, where a civil commitment would do as
well."
5Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 689,
declared:
Finally, I deem this application of 'cruel and unusual punish-
ment' so novel that I suspect the Court was hard put to find a way
to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result reached
today rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty. If this case
involved economic regulation, the present Court's allergy to sub-
stantive due process would surely save the statute and prevent the
Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections upon state
legislatures or Congress. I fail to see why the Court deems it more
appropriate to write into the Constitution its own abstract notions
of how best to handle the narcotics problem, for it obviously can-
not match either the States or Congress in expert understanding.
16 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
17 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
18Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
19 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), though decided on privi-
leges and immunities grounds, established a right to travel under the
federal constitution. The right to travel was recognized on fourteenth
amendment due process grounds in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941), and Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). In these cases,
the state had placed restrictions upon indigents and convicted felons,
respectively, to enter the state. Query: Had the Court wanted to decide
the Robinson case on other grounds, could it not have said that the
statute prohibiting addiction, even without proof of use, placed an un-
constitutional restraint upon an addict from entering the state?
CASENOTES
narcotics. The state may civilly confine an addict for treatment,20
or it may use other means to discourage and treat addiction,21 but
the person does have a right not to be punished for being in the
status of drug addiction.
It would obviously be cruel and unusual, under Robinson, to
punish a person under a statute which is constitutionally objec-
tionable on other grounds. The protection of Robinson, however,
reaches beyond such cases and forbids the punishment of acts which
are not otherwise protected, and even demands that a new ap-
praisal be made of the criminal law to determine where criminal
statutes are void for punishing conduct which is not really criminal
in nature.
Poe v. Ullman22 involved Connecticut statutes forbidding a
married woman to use, and a doctor to advise her in the use of,
contraceptives for medical purposes. The Court decided the case
without reaching the issue of whether the state can constitutionally
punish such conduct. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent,2 however,
asserted that it is clearly beyond the police power of the state to
invade the privacy of the home in this manner, urging that there
20 California has a statute allowing the confinement of dope addicts, CAL.
WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 5350-5361 (1956).
2lThe Court said in Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664-65:
Such [permissiblel regulation [of the narcotic drugs traffic],
it can be assumed, could take a variety of valid forms. A state might
impose criminal sanctions, for example, against the unauthorized
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics
within its borders. In the interest of discouraging the violation of
such laws, or in the interest of the general health or welfare of its
inhabitants, a State might establish a program of compulsory treat-
ment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment
might require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal sanc-
tions might be imposed for failure to comply with established com-
pulsory treatment procedures. Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905). Or a state might choose to attack the evils of nar-
cotics traffic on broader fronts also-through public health educa-
tion, for example, or by efforts to ameliorate the economic and
social conditions under which those evils might be thought to
flourish. In short, the range of valid choice which a State might
make in this area is undoubtedly a wide one, and the wisdom of
any particular choice within the allowable spectrum is not for us
to decide.
22367 U.S. 497 (1961).
231d. at 522. Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Precisely what is involved here is this: the State is asserting
the right to enforce its moral judgment by intruding upon the most
intimate details of the marital relation with the full power of the
criminal law ... arrests, searches and seizures; inevitably, it must
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
are limits to the reach of justifiable state control, and that 'certain
areas of human activity are, by their nature, not properly regulated
by criminal sanctions. This, then, is the apparent'meaning 'of
Robinson. Although the state may control drug addictioni, iriminal
prohibition of the status itself is cruel and unusual because it is
not actually criminal, in nature.
Butler v. Michigan2 -4 involved the right of the state to prohibit
completely the distribution of literature which would "tend to the
demoralizatibn of children."25 The Court held that the 'statute
invblved was not reasonably restricted to the problem sought, to
be controlled, and therefore, was an' ar'bitrary exercise of the
police power and a violation of the right of free press. ' Con-
sidering Butler in conjunction with Robinson, it may be -seen
that the state is restricted in its criminal power to the reasonable
restraint of -act-ions -which are actually criminal in-nature. Certain
activities,, traits,- or 2weaknesses, though socially undesirable, are
not amenable to -control by criminal sanctions. -
II.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS-
A :FEW SPECIFICS
Although Robinson forbids the punishment of "status crimes,"
no detail ed analysis of such constitutionally protected stAus- is
made. It would seem that statutes punishing a -person for being a
"commnion-drunk,12 0 or imposing harsher penalties-upon a "tramp" 27
mean at the very least the lodging of -criminal, charges, a public
trial, and testimony as to the corpus delicti. Id. at 548.
He added:
Though undoubtedly the States are.and should- be-ieft free to
reflecta .idejvariety of-policies, and, should be allowed broad scbpe
in experimenting with various means of:promoting those policies,
I must agree -with Mr. Justice Jackson that 'There are limits to
the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may con-
duct.,".- experiments at.the expense of the dignity and personality'
of the individual.: Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942)].
In this instance these. limits are, -in my view, reached and passed.
Id at 555.
24352 U.S. 380 (1957).
251d. at 381.
2 0State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N.E. 572 (1900) did hold'that it was
not cruel and unusual for a punishment for assault under the state
"Trarixp Law"r to be more -severe than usual, but the decision rested
primarily on the concept that the punishment itself was not cruel and
unusual in nature.
2 7E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1115'through 28-1119 (Reissue 1956).
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or "common beggar, '28 would be subject to the same arguments
as those made in Robinson. As with a drug addict, reformation of
such a person as a "common drunk," "tramp" or "beggar" is ob-
viously difficult, regardless of his intent or desire to reform. His
difficulty in reforming would necessarily involve continuing liabil-
ity to criminal punishments.
Robinson did not reach the point of whether one may be con-
victed of being under the influence of narcotics,29 or even in the
state of intoxication, but such a person would likewise be in a
condition where immediate reform would be impossible, and sub-
ject to continuous criminal liability. Unquestionably, a state may
restrain a person while he is not in full control of his faculties; but,
imprisonment beyond the period necessary for the protection of
himself and society raises questions of punishment rather than
mere deterrence.
Similarly, Robinson raised, but did not answer, the question
of whether a person could be convicted for the use of narcotics.30
The state could possibly punish a non-addict for using narcotics on
the theory that this is a means of deterring him from becoming an
addict. However, if an involuntary addict is unable, without medi-
cal or other treatment, to resist the use of narcotics, is it not un-
reasonable, and therefore cruel and unusual, to punish him for his
unavoidable conduct?
Another question raised by Robinson is that of its effect upon
other types of crime which derive from mental deficiency. For
example, a person might realize that it is wrong to set fires, but
because of a mental disorder, burn a building. Do not Robinson
and modern concepts of humanity and justice demand treatment
28Such status is usually forbidden under vagrancy statutes, which punish,
not the act of begging itself, but "persons ... who go about from door to
door, or from place to place, or occupy public places for the purpose of
begging and receiving alms .... " NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1119 (Reissue
1956).
29The question was not specifically raised since there was no evidence that
the defendant had been under the influence of narcotics at the time of
the arrest.
3O0Indeed, the Court very carefully avoided the question. This prompted
Mr. Justice White to assert in his dissent:
It is significant that in purporting to reaffirm the power of
the States to deal with the narcotics traffic, the Court does not
include among the obvious powers of the State the power to punish
for the use of narcotics. I cannot think that the omission was in-
advertent. 370 U.S. at 688.
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rather than punishment? In Lynch v. Overholzer,31 the Court held
that it would be a violation of due process (no mention of cruel
and unusual punishment) to confine to a hospital one found not
guilty because of insanity, where there was no showing that he was
either insane at the time of commitment, or likely to become in-
sane again. It is at least as improper to punish where treatment is
necessary for rehabilitation.
The Court in Robinson speaks of the impropriety of any statute
which unreasonably subjects a person to "continuing liability. '3 2
It would seem that this objection would apply in a bigamy prosecu-
tion where a person has remarried after he reasonably, but er-
roneously, believed that he had been divorced. 3 It is basically
unfair to punish someone who, innocently and in good faith, enters
a status otherwise desirable to society. A second marriage is not
really so dangerous to society that the parties should be strictly
liable for any unknown imperfections in a previous divorce.
In Smith v. California,3 4 the Court held that the arrest of a
bookseller on charges of selling obscene literature was a violation
of the right of free press under the fourteenth amendment where
there was no showing that the accused either knew or reasonably
should have known the contents of the books which he sold. Phras-
ing the issue differently, is it not cruel and unusual to punish a
31369 U.S. 705 (1962), cited by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 676.
32370 U.S. at 666:
[We deal with a statute which makes the 'status' of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be
prosecuted 'at any time before he reforms.' California has said
that a person can be continuously guilty of this offense, whether
or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State,
and whether or not he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior
there.
3 3 See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945), in which the
parties, formerly residents of North Carolina, went to Nevada to get
divorces from their respective spouses, then remarried each other. They
returned to North Carolina and were prosecuted for bigamy. The Court
reversed the conviction on a prior appeal on grounds that the divorces in
Nevada had to be given full faith and credit by the North Carolina
courts as to the facts tried by the Nevada courts. Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). After a retrial and new conviction, the
parties again appealed. The North Carolina courts denied that Nevada
had jurisdiction to grant the divorces, and therefore held the divorces
invalid. The Court affirmed the convictions on grounds that the full
faith and credit clause of. the Constitution did not require that other
states with an interest in the matter accept the facts of jurisdiction as
found by the Nevada court.
34361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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person for performing some valuable function with reasonable dili-
gence and without moral dereliction?
Wieman v. Updegraff 5 held that a state cannot remove a per-
son from state employment for having been a member of a subver-
sive organization unless it is shown that he had knowledge of the
nature of its purposes. This again involves a problem of innocent
intent. Is it not cruel and unusual to punish a person for belonging
innocently to an organization which commits an improper act? For
example, X corporation commits an illegal act. The criminal pun-
ishment of the corporation itself30 falls not upon the officers or di-
rectors who have the control of the corporation, but upon the stock-
holders, even those who, from every realistic standpoint, were not
culpable in the wrong of the corporation. Similarly, it would seem
to be of questionable constitutional propriety to hold an innocent
partner liable for the criminal conduct which his partner commits
for the partnership, or an innocent principal criminally liable for
the acts of his agents. If the person neither knew nor reasonably
should have known what the other was doing, it is unjustifiable
to hold him criminally liable.
The question of culpability is similarly raised in cases involv-
ing motor vehicle homicide and similar crimes involving the death
of persons due to the improper driving of an automobile by the de-
fendant. Where the defendant's negligence has not made injury
to life, limb or property of others probable,37 but merely possible,
35344 U.S. 183 (1952).
36 It has usually been held that a corporate stockholder is not individually
liable for a crime committed by the corporation unless he is shown to
have some special relationship to the firm. In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104
(S.D. Ohio 1892). He may, however, be held if he actually partici-
pated in the crime. Commonwealth ex rel. Cunningham v. Dean, 30
Pa. Dist. 563 (Q.S. Philadelphia Co. 1921). The corporation itself may
be held criminally liable where punishment is by fine. Joplin Mercantile
Co. v. United States, 213 Fed. 926 (8th Cir. 1914). This holds true, even
where the crime requires specific intent, on the theory that the intent
of its agents may be imputed to the corporation. United States v. Nearing,
252 Fed. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). For a general description and discussion
of a corporation's criminal liability, see 19 C.J.S. Corporations 1358-71
(1940).
37As, perhaps, in the case of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 IN.W. 177 (1921); State v. Kline,
168 Minn. 263, 209 N.W. 881 (1926); Maxon v. State, 177 Wis. 319, 187
N.W. 753 (1922).
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it seems improper to hold him criminally responsible for a death
resulting from his concededly wrongful conduct.38 In other words,
a violation of speed laws, traffic ordinances, etc., commits a legal
wrong and may be punished by the state, usually by a small fine.
If as the result of such violation someone is fortuitously killed,
the present law in most states may allow the defendant to be
punished for the killing as well as for the traffic offense.39 His
wrongful conduct, however, involved no more than the minor of-
fense-the death often being a tragic, but truly unexpected and
unavoidable, misfortune.40 No one would deny that the nation's
traffic problem is extremely serious, but the imprisonment of peo-
ple who fortuitously happen to kill does not really deter simple
negligence or the violation of minor traffic ordinances. A similar
application of this analysis of culpability may be made in the case
of felony murder where the defendant, though guilty of a lesser
felony, is not really the direct and active cause of the death result-
ing from the commission of the felony.41
Another situation which often involves a "crime" without guilty
conduct is that of writing an insufficient fund check. A person in-
nocently writing a check, which he erroneously thinks is covered
by funds in his account, subjects himself to criminal liability.42
3 8 Indeed, the contributory negligence of the deceased does not even affect
the defendant's guilt. State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 Atl. 927 (1910);
Lauterbach v. State, 132 Tenn. 603, 179 S.W. 130 (1915). See generally
Comment, The Fallacy and Fortuity-of Motor Vehicle Homicide, 41 NEB.
L. REV. 793 (1962).
39E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-403.01 (Reissue 1956). See Pribyl v. State,
165 Neb. 691, 87 N.W.2d 201 (1957); Birdsley v. State, 161 Neb. 581, 74
N.W.2d 377 (1956); Bird~ley v. Kelley, 159 Neb. 74, 65 N.W.2d 328 (1954).
40 Commonwealth v. Root, 195 Pa. Super. 164, 170 A.2d 310 (1961), involved
the question of whether the defendant was guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter when he engaged in an automobile race on the highway and the
driver of the other automobile collided with the deceased. The court
held that this was not involuntary manslaughter, on grounds that
the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the death.
Is this not another way of saying that, even though the defendant was
guilty of racing on the highway, he should not be liable for every
fortuitous mishap which occurs as the result of the original, and separately
punishable, wrong, where his wrongful conduct does not go beyond that
original wrong? But see Jones. v, Commonwealth, 247 S.W.2d 517 (Ky.
1952); State v. Fair, 209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E.2d 634 (1946).
41See 47 IowA L. REV. 1116 (1962) and cases collected therein. See par-
ticularly the inconsistency of application of the felony murder rules noted
Id., n.5 at p. 1118.
4 2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1213 (Reissue 1956).
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Although it may be a defense that the writing of the check was
without knowledge of the insufficiency,43 such a defense is usually
difficult to prove and, in Nebraska, statutes raise a presumption of
knowledge.4 4 Similarly, where malice cannot be shown by eye-
witnesses in such crimes as second-degree murder, the law allows
an implication of malice.4 5 It is questionable whether such limita-
tions on the state's burden of proof are really justified. It is cer-
tainly no harder for the state to prove wrongful intent or malice
than it is for the accused to prove the lack thereof. It is cruel and
unusual to punish a person merely because it is impossible for him
to prove his innocence, even though the state can no more success-
fully prove his guilty state of mind. The whole of the criminal law
has traditionally asserted that an accused person is innocent until
proven guilty. Presumptions and definitions of the criminal law
which circumvent the right of the accused person to be assumed
innocent until conviction are cruel and unusual in the Robinson
sense.
An attempt has been made here to analyze the Robinson ap-
plication of cruel and unusual punishments prohibitions in terms
of a few specific crimes. The crimes discussed were intended to
be merely illustrative, by no means comprehensive. The extent to
which criminally forbidden types of conduct involve dubious culpa-
bility no doubt encompasses far greater numbers of "crimes." In-
deed, Robinson makes it incumbent that the objectives and methods
of our whole criminal law system be re-examined and re-appraised.
4 3 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1213 (Reissue 1956) specifies that the insufficient
fund check must be made with intent to defraud.
4 4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1214 (Reissue 1956) -provides -for a presumption of
an intent to defraud and of knowledge of insufficient funds in the
drawer's account, unless the drawer pays the amount of the check within
five days after notice.
45 Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Myers, 402 Pa. 451, 167 A.2d 295 (1961)
states, in regard to a presumption of malice in a second-degree murder
conviction:
Charges to the jury about the presumption of second degree are
often followed by the statement that the burden is on the defendant
to lower the offense to manslaughter. The trial judge in the instant
case first correctly said 'until the contrary appears in evidence',
but later referred to the defendant's burden. We disapprove the
use hereafter of an instruction that refers to the defendant's
'burden'. A defendant has no burden whatever, and the word
'presumption' may impress the jury as establishing the crime
at the high level of second degree murder and requiring the de-
fendant to present extenuating evidence, failing which the jury
would be required to convict him. No jury can be required to con-
vict anybody of anything. 402 Pa. at 455, 167 A.2d at 297-98.
695
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CONCLUSION
Had Robinson v. California been decided fifty years ago, the
decision would probably have been to allow the conviction of a
narcotic addict. But with scientific knowledge of the nature and
methods of treatment for narcotics addiction developed to what it is
today, the Court could only say that narcotics addiction is not truly
a type of criminal conduct. Inherent in Robinson is all the medical
knowledge that has been gained in recent years. As medical and
scientific knowledge increase, especially in the fields of mental
and emotional illness, perhaps even greater emphasis will be placed
upon treatment of wrongdoers, rather than upon their punish-
ment. Indeed, to the extent that nearly all criminal activity is the
result of emotional or social maladjustment, perhaps some future
generation will see the termination of penal sanctions as we know
them today.
For the immediate future, Robinson places in question the
constitutional validity of laws which merely punish convicted per-
sons where no purpose of deterrence, rehabilitation, or prevention
of crime is or reasonably can be hoped for.
Robinson is merely the formal judicial declaration of a principle
of mercy which is certainly as old as the criminal law itself. Who
has not, upon hearing of the conviction of an acquaintance, said,
"He really wasn't a bad person"? What prosecuting attorney or
judge has not been embarrassed by a conviction of someone who
really did not deserve punishment per se? This emotional reaction
against a conviction which profits society nothing in reformation or
prevention of crime is the spirit of Robinson v. California.
Calvin E. Robinson '64
